Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports Volume 191

(Replaces Prior Cumulative Table)

Clasby v. Zimmerman	143
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Ponger	76
Dinham v. Commissioner of Correction	84
Freeman v. A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc	110
Gudino v. Commissioner of Correction	263

Harris v. Commissioner of Correction	238
In re Leo L	134
In Re Skylar F	200
Lewis v. Newtown. Summary judgment; whether trial court properly granted motion for summary judgment on ground of governmental immunity pursuant to statute (§ 52-57n [a] [2] [B]); claim that trial court improperly concluded that complaint did not contain allegations of negligence directed at acts and omissions of defendants' faculty and staff during shooting at school; claim that trial court improperly concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish existence of genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants' implementation of school security guidelines was discretionary; claim that trial court improperly determined that identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity did not apply to defendants' claim of immunity; whether trial court improperly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether adoption of school security guidelines was discretionary act within defendants' general duty to manage and supervise employees and schoolchildren, and, therefore, protected by governmental immunity.	213
Maria W. v. Eric W. Dissolution of marriage; motion for contempt; claim that trial court abused its discretion by admitting plaintiff's testimony that defendant previously had been arrested and charged with certain criminal offenses; claim that trial court improperly found defendant in arrears on child support and alimony obligations and ordered him to make certain weekly payments; whether order appealed from was final where trial court resolved some, but not all, claims in motion for contempt and continued matter to later date for determination of whether defendant's failure to pay arrears was wilful or due to inability to pay; whether this court lacked jurisdiction to entertain claim on appeal due to lack of final judgment.	27
Marvin v. Board of Education	169
McGinty v. Stamford Police Dept	163

for benefits under Heart and Hypertension Act (§ 7-433c) was compensable; whether commissioner's finding that plaintiff suffered from heart disease was supported by record.	
Mosby v. Board of Education	280
eny granteu motion for summary flugment for tack of sunating; fatture to orief claim adequately.	
1916 Post Road Associates, LLC v. Mrs. Green's of Fairfield, Inc.	16
Landlord-tenant; guarantee of commercial lease; whether trial court properly granted motion for summary judgment; whether guarantor's letters to plaintiff created genuine issue of material fact as to whether guarantor was liable to plaintiff lessor for debts of lessee.	
Scott v. CCMC Faculty Practice Plan, Inc.	251
Medical malpractice; claim that trial court improperly permitted defendants to intro- duce evidence that, after surgery, plaintiff's pain substantially resolved due to syrinx that had developed within his spinal cord to establish reduction in dam- ages; claim that syrinx evidence had to be categorized as "benefits evidence" under Restatement (Second) of Torts (§ 920) that was outside pleadings and	
contrary to public policy; whether trial court erred when it failed to give plaintiff's requested jury instructions regarding syrinx evidence; claim that trial court's rulings were harmful because syrinx evidence permeated case; claim that trial court's rulings were harmful because jury could have considered syrinx evidence in its determination of liability.	
Smith v. Marshview Fitness, LLC	1
Fraudulent transfer; motion for summary judgment; claim that trial court improperly concluded that transfer of certain property to defendant company was not fraudulent under common law or Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (§ 52-552a et seq.) on ground that property did not constitute "assets" because it was encumbered by valid lien in excess of its value; claim that trial court improperly rendered summary judgment on claim alleging violation of Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.) because underlying conduct on which plaintiff claimed defendant company violated CUTPA was broader than facts supporting his fraudulent transfer claims; whether trial court abused its discretic in the seq.)	
tion in denying motion to reargue motion for summary judgment.	104
Manslaughter in first degree; claim that trial court improperly deprived defendant of constitutional right to fair trial when it failed to instruct jury, sua sponte, about inherent shortcomings of simultaneous foreign language interpretation of trial testimony; claim that trial court improperly deprived defendant of constitutional right to fair trial when it instructed jury that it could consider as consciousness of guilt evidence that defendant changed shirt shortly after victim was stabbed; whether defendant was presented with meaningful opportunity to review and comment on trial court's jury instructions; whether defendant waived right to challenge constitutionality of jury instruction under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233); whether jury reasonably could have found from evidence that defendant's act of changing shirt was motivated by desire to avoid detection by law enforcement.	184
State v. Clark	191
Assault in second degree; whether trial court properly denied motion to suppress oral statement defendant made to police officer during alleged custodial interrogation in defendant's apartment before defendant was advised of constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436); whether trial court properly determined that defendant was not in custody at time statement was made; whether reasonable person in defendant's position would have believed that her freedom of movement was restrained to degree associated with formal arrest.	
State v. Daniels	33
Intentional manslaughter in first degree; reckless manslaughter in first degree; misconduct with motor vehicle; claim that jury's guilty verdicts were legally inconsistent in that each of alleged crimes required mutually exclusive mental state; claim that trial court erred when it failed to exclude certain testimonial hearsay; whether verdicts required findings that defendant simultaneously acted intentionally and recklessly with respect to different results: whether jury reason-	
ably could have found that defendant specifically intended to cause serious physi-	

63

cal injury to victim and that, in doing so, consciously disregarded substantial and unjustifiable risk that actions created grave risk of death to victim; whether defendant's conviction required jury to find that defendant acted intentionally and criminally negligent with respect to different results; whether defendant could have intended to cause serious physical injury to victim while, at same time, failing to perceive substantial and unjustifiable risk that manner in which defendant operated vehicle would cause victim's death; whether mental state element for crimes of reckless manslaughter and misconduct with motor vehicle, or criminally negligent operation of motor vehicle, were mutually exclusive when examined under facts and state's theory that two strikes of victim's vehicle by defendant was one continuous act; whether defendant could have consciously disregarded substantial and unjustifiable risk that actions would cause victim's death while simultaneously failing to perceive substantial and unjustifiable risk that actions would cause victim's death; whether mental states required for reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent operation related to same result; whether admission of out-of-court statement for purposes other than its truth raised confrontation clause issue and was of constitutional magnitude under second prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233); whether statement at issue was hearsay.

State v. Mercer.

Sexual assault in first degree; unlawful restraint in first degree; claim that defendant was deprived of constitutional rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining stage of proceedings because state initially charged defendant with crime predicated on misunderstanding of victim's age; whether record was adequate to conduct meaningful review of defendant's claim.